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You implement that NAFTA, the Mexican trade agreement, where 
they pay people a dollar an hour, have no health care, no retirement, 
no pollution controls, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and you’re going 
to hear a giant sucking sound of jobs being pulled out of this country 
right at a time when we need the tax base to pay the debt and pay 
down the interest on the debt and get our house back in order.
  H. Ross Perot, U.S. Presidential Debate, October 19, 1992
INTRODUCTION
Within developed countries, does greater trade liberalization increase or decrease 
poverty? This paper uses data on U.S. states and Canadian provinces from 1986 to 
1997 to examine the empirical relationship between international trade and poverty 
intensity. Its motivation is the fact that political debates on trade policy often appeal 
to the insecurities of voters, and an understandable source of voter anxiety about the 
potential impacts of greater trade openness is the prospect of a greater probability 
and/or a greater depth of income poverty. Although advocates of trade liberalization 
commonly appeal to its positive impacts on growth and average income, the rate and 
depth of poverty depend on the lower tail of the distribution of income. It is entirely 
plausible that greater openness to trade could increase both average incomes and the 
inequality of incomes, with an ambiguous net effect on the population with incomes 
below the poverty line. 
As well, greater openness to trade implies both more exports and more imports. 
The loss of jobs, and downward pressure on wages, in import competing industries 
creates economic losses for some—but greater employment in the export sector pro-
duces economic gains for others. The net impact of trade, at each point in the income 
distribution, depends on the relative balance of these competing inﬂ  uences. Because 
it is of interest to know which dominates, in increasing or decreasing the intensity 278 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
of poverty, this paper explicitly distinguishes between the impact of greater exports 
and imports on poverty intensity.
We emphasize poverty intensity because both the rate and depth of poverty are 
important. Because both depend on the shape of the lower tail of the distribution of 
income, identifying the impact of trade requires reliable, comparable income distribu-
tion data, preferably from jurisdictions with a range of trade exposure, over a period of 
time when trade exposure changed appreciably, and with a sufﬁ  ciently large sample 
size to control for ﬁ  xed effects and for the possible impact on poverty of other inﬂ  u-
ences, such as macroeconomic conditions or social assistance policies. With 50 states 
(and the District of Columbia) and ten provinces, North American data are an obvious 
candidate, but in using poverty data from states and provinces, it is reasonable to be 
cautious about the information content of estimates of poverty intensity which may 
be drawn, at the state or province level, from small samples of households.1 Hence, a 
methodological innovation of this paper is to use bootstrap-estimated standard errors 
of these estimates of poverty intensity at the state and province level to condition 
weighted least squares estimates of their determinants. As well, a second level of 
uncertainty arises because any regression that uses a sample of states or provinces 
as observations is open to the potential critique that a different sample of jurisdic-
tions might have produced different results. Hence, this paper also uses bootstrap 
methods to assess the possible degree of bias in estimation from sampling variability 
in jurisdictions.
The next section begins by surveying the available literature on the relationship 
between poverty and trade, while the section after that presents the conceptual frame-
work for our empirical analysis. Next there is a section which discusses the data and 
econometric methodology. This is followed by a section which presents results and 
discusses their implications.
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Growth economists have often used cross-country regressions, but they have often 
approached the relationship between trade and poverty in two steps. In the ﬁ  rst step, 
one examines whether trade raises growth; in the second, the question is whether 
growth lowers poverty – the implicit assumption is that all sources of growth are 
similar in their impact on poverty. It is common to ﬁ  nd that trade leads to growth; 
for example, Frankel and Romer [1999] use the geographical components of bilateral 
trade to instrument for the trade share in growth regressions and ﬁ  nd that trade is 
positively and signiﬁ  cantly related to income per capita. Alcalá and Ciccone [2004] 
show that what they term “real openness” (trade as a share of PPP GDP) is positively 
related to growth. However, Rodriguez and Rodrik [2001] and Rodrik, Subramanian, 
and Trebbi [2002] criticize this and other papers purporting to show a trade-growth 
relationship. Still, Baldwin’s [2003] survey concludes that more open trade policy does 
lead to growth, when combined with macroeconomic stability and good institutions.
Researchers have also found that growth reduces poverty. Roemer and Gugerty 
[1997] ﬁ  nd that faster GDP growth causes faster growth in the incomes of the poor-
est 40%. Ravallion [2001] and Dollar and Kraay [2001] also ﬁ  nd that faster growth 
reduces poverty by raising the incomes of the poor.279 THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF TRADE
Unlike growth economists, development economists are more likely to use 
household-level data and are more open to the possibility that trade may make some 
individuals worse off, even if the average individual in a country is made better off. 
Reimer [2002] considers many possible links between increased trade and changing 
poverty, such as factor prices, income, and employment; external shocks that change 
the terms of trade; and short-run risk and adjustment costs. Winters [2000] claims 
that, despite the potential increased terms-of-trade volatility, the lower variability of 
international as opposed to domestic markets should make aggregate risk fall. How-
ever, Rodrik [1997] claims that the specialization and decreased diversiﬁ  cation caused 
by openness leads to increased risk, since the stability of domestic production matters, 
not the stability of the world; he ﬁ  nds that greater exposure to external risk leads to 
greater volatility in income. Stiglitz [2003] discusses such potential adverse effects of 
globalization as low job creation, higher risk, and an erosion of social capital. 
The empirical results are mixed. Santarelli and Figini [2002] ﬁ  nd that trade 
reduces absolute but not relative poverty. Hertel, Ivanic, Preckel, and Cranﬁ  eld 
[2003] use household surveys from 14 developing countries to show that the average 
household is made modestly better off by trade liberalization, but poor households 
are often made worse off. In an exhaustive survey, Winters et al. [2004] conclude that 
the evidence supports the view that trade liberalization reduces poverty in the long 
run, but not necessarily in the short run.
Researchers studying the effects of trade in industrial countries have tended to 
focus on income inequality rather than poverty. However, poverty and inequality are 
different issues, whether the poverty line is drawn using a relative or absolute method-
ology, since aggregate inequality statistics are inevitably dominated by the non-poor, 
who remain a large majority of the population however the poverty line is drawn.2 In 
cross-country comparisons, there is a far from perfect correlation (0.79) between poverty 
intensity and the Gini Index of inequality (see Osberg and Xu [2000, 68-69]). 
Mahler [2001] ﬁ  nds little evidence of a relationship between globalization and 
the income distribution for 14 industrial countries. Most other researchers have used 
industry-level trade and wage data, ﬁ  nding in most cases that, while trade is undoubt-
edly to blame for a signiﬁ  cant part of the rise in inequality over the last generation, it 
is not the sole or even strongest factor. Wood [1994] attributes almost the entire rise 
in the skill premium to North-South trade. However, Lawrence and Slaughter [1993] 
stress that, according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, 
rising wage inequality could not be due to trade, given that neither the relative price 
of unskilled labor-intensive imports nor the skilled-to-unskilled employment ratio has 
fallen.3 Krugman’s [1995a; 1995b] general-equilibrium analysis suggests that North-
South trade is sufﬁ  ciently small (non-oil imports from low-wage countries to the U.S. 
amounted to less than 3% of U.S. GDP in 1990) that it could not possibly explain the 
rise in inequality. Harrigan [1998] also uses a general-equilibrium model to show that 
imports have played a negligible role in causing the rise in wage inequality. Borjas, 
Freeman, and Katz [1997] ﬁ  nd that trade and immigration contributed less than 
20% of the rise in the skilled to unskilled wage ratio. Finally, Cline’s [1997] summary 
and analysis of the evidence states that only one-fourth to one-ﬁ  fth of the rise in the 
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The literature on trade and risk focuses on the rise in instability caused by in-
creased openness. This rise in instability may have many possible sources, such as 
increased exchange-rate risk (see, for example, Gagnon [1993]). Gottschalk and Mofﬁ  tt 
[1994] ﬁ  nd that a rise in the instability of earnings can account for one-third of the 
widening in the U.S. earnings distribution between the 1970s and the 1980s. Rodrik 
[1997] provides many examples of increased risk due to globalization, such as a rise 
in the elasticity of demand for unskilled workers. This is caused by an asymmetry 
between groups that can more easily cross borders (such as capital and highly-skilled 
workers) and those that are locked in (such as low-skilled workers), and results in 
greater instability in incomes when there are shocks to labor demand. Rodrik [1998] 
points out that openness might be thought to lower risk, given that any one economy 
must be more volatile than the overall world economy. However, openness causes risk 
by encouraging specialization, which leads to less diversiﬁ  cation, and the stability of 
the world is not what matters, but the stability of domestic production. Empirically, 
Rodrik ﬁ  nds that greater exposure to external risk (measured by the terms of trade 
or the product concentration of exports) does lead to greater volatility in income. 
However, the weakness of all this, from the perspective of this paper’s focus on pov-
erty, is that poverty outcomes depend on a particular segment (the lower tail) of the 
income distribution—which can be poorly predicted by greater volatility or inequality 
in general.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Suppose that we think of the national economy as having two sectors: internation-
ally tradable (T) and non-tradable (N) goods and services. Each individual worker draws 
his or her income from one sector or the other as per equation (1) or equation (2).
(1) 
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(2)  ,
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i Y  are average income in the traded (T) and non-traded (N) sectors in period t,
αT
i, αN
i are the relative (i.e., ratio to mean) permanent personal advantages of indi-
vidual i in the traded and non-traded sectors, and
εT
it, εN
it are the shocks in the traded and non-traded sectors.
E(αT
i) = E(αN
i) = 0, E(εT
it) = E(εN
it) = 0, εT ~ FT(0,σT), εN ~ FN(0,σN).
Average income in a country is then given as equation (3) where βt is the propor-
tion of employment in the tradable sector at time t.
(3)  (1 )
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A policy shift to greater openness in international trade may be motivated by the 
expectation that equation (4) holds. However, it may also be recognized that the trad-
able sector can be more exposed to shocks (impacting on both wages and employment), 







Presumably, the labor supply of individuals to sectors is driven by some combina-
tion of their attitudes to risk, the correlation of relative abilities across sectors, the 
average income differential (equation (4)) and the difference in stochastic variability 
(equation (5)). In a full general equilibrium model, relative labor supplies by sector 
would interact with sectoral elasticities of demand to determine the equilibrium rela-
tive income ratio. For present purposes, all we need to assume is that equations (4) 
and (5) hold and that the industrial structure of states (provinces) differs. Each state 
(province) of workforce ns within a country of size N has a speciﬁ  c industrial structure 
βs. Equation (6) summarizes the overall relation.
(6)  / ts t s t nN ββ =⋅ ∑
Overall, then, the greater dispersion of income in the tradable sector opens up 
the possibility that poverty will rise as labor ﬂ  ows into traded industries, but the 
combination of a higher mean income with greater variance of incomes in the traded 
sector means that there is no clear prediction about poverty probability.
If FT and FN denote the cumulative distribution function of income in tradable and 
non-tradable sectors (for a person of given characteristics), then poverty probability 
in a state (province) would be given by equation (7).
(7)  ( ( )) (1 )( ( )) ss T s N RF P F P ββ =+ −
This paper distinguishes between poverty, and the more general case of lower 
income, because, in addition to worrying in general about the loss in utility produced 
by a possible income loss, people worry about poverty because there is something dif-
ferent about being poor. Adam Smith wrote of the importance of meeting customary 
consumption norms: “the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful 
degree of poverty, which, it is presumed, nobody can fall into without extreme bad 
conduct.”4 Sen [1985] introduces the vocabulary of functionings or capabilities, such 
as the capability of appearing in public without shame as to shabby clothing. Bour-
guignon and Fields [1997] note that if there is something qualitatively different about 
being poor, the utility function is discontinuous at the poverty line. Hence, there is 282 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
good reason for individuals to care about both their probability of poverty and the 
depth of that poverty, if it occurs.
If, as equations (1) and (2) summarize, the current pre-tax income of individuals 
can be neatly divided into permanent differentials and stochastic shocks, one could 
categorize the corresponding social transfers as arising from social assistance or 
social insurance programs. The simplest characterization of a social assistance pro-
gram that aims at redistribution of permanent income is in terms of its guarantee 
rate (g0) and implicit tax rate (t0) which together determine net transfers 
0
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Social insurance programs (like unemployment insurance) can be characterized 
as a form of co-insurance, or risk-sharing, among individuals, in which people with 
positive income shocks pay taxes and those who get negative shocks receive beneﬁ  ts 
(Bi’). A simple characterization5 of such a system is equation (9):
(9)  ′ =− Bt i 11 ε
In this highly simpliﬁ  ed world, the after-tax income of workers in non-tradables 
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If social assistance and social insurance programs are delivered at the state (pro-
vincial)6 level then one must add a subscript to denote the state-speciﬁ  c level of welfare 
payments (gos) and the state-speciﬁ  c replacement rate in social insurance (tis). Denote 
the cumulative distribution function corresponding to equation (10) as 
* N
s F  and that 
corresponding to equation (11) as 
* T
s F . After taxes and transfers, when the poverty 
line is P, the poverty rate in a given state (province) is then given by equation (12).
(12) 
** ()( 1 ) ()
TN
ss s s s RF P F P ββ =+ −
We cannot unambiguously predict the impact of trade openness (∂Rs /∂βs >< 0), but 
the implication of greater risk pooling in social insurance programs is clear (∂Rs/∂t1s < 
0) and so is the impact of greater generosity in social assistance (∂Rs /∂gos < 0).
In reality, of course, UI and social assistance programs are highly complex pro-
grams. Both simultaneously redistribute income between lifetime income classes and 283 THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF TRADE
between contingencies (such as employment or unemployment) that are experienced 
within lifetime income classes. In reality, program designers and administrators can-
not easily distinguish permanent and transitory differences in earnings capacity, or 
the voluntary and involuntary utilization of that capacity. A major part of the design 
and administration of these programs is driven by the incentive problem, and program 
managers’ desire to minimize their impact on labor supply. Boadway and Cuff [1999] 
is an example of recent theoretical literature that outlines why, in an environment 
of imperfect information, program designers will utilize both types of programs, and 
will also institute controls for job search and work effort.
However, the bottom line for present purposes is that variations in UI and social 
assistance generosity are likely to have distinct effects on the intensity of poverty. 
The exposure of a region to trade, on the other hand, has ambiguous effects.
DATA AND REGRESSION METHODS
Our goal is to determine the effect of trade exposure on poverty intensity, using 
data from Canadian provinces and U.S. states in 1986, 1991, 1994, and 1997.  7 In 
addressing this issue, sampling variability can be important at both the household 
and the regional level, since sampling variability inﬂ  uences both the reliability of 
each jurisdiction’s estimated level of poverty and the reliability of cross-jurisdiction 
regressions. 
When estimates of a population characteristic (like the rate or average depth of 
poverty) are derived from an absolutely small sample from the population, sampling 
variability can be an important source of heteroskedasticity, if that estimate is sub-
sequently used as the dependent variable in a regression. The problem of sampling 
variability in this sense is that a different sample of households could equally well 
have been drawn within states or provinces, so that although any given random sample 
provides an unbiased estimate of the dependent variable, in a cross state/province 
regression, the dependent variable has a standard error whose size depends on the 
size of the sample of households within each state or province. Since U.S. micro data 
from the Current Population Survey varies widely in sample size at the state level, 
we construct the standard errors of our poverty intensity estimate to correct for het-
eroskedasticity, so that jurisdictions with smaller standard errors of estimate of the 
dependent variable are weighted more heavily. 
A different level of sampling variability surrounds the selection of the jurisdic-
tions that are the units of observation in cross state/province regressions. Historical 
happenstance has determined that California and North Dakota each count as one 
state, even though California’s population is over ﬁ  fty times that of North Dakota. If 
California had been split into 50 separate states, each with a weight equal to that of 
North Dakota, would the results of a cross state/province regression change? In cross-
country regressions, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh now enter as unique observations, 
and cross-state regressions within each country take their present political borders 
as given—but if British rule of India had ended a bit differently, they might now all 
be part of a single successor state to the British Raj. Even within North America, had 
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and, more recently, Quebec could very easily not be a part of Canada.9 Indeed, the 
sample of states that comprise the U.S. would now be different, if the secession of the 
Confederacy had succeeded. The implication of all this is that if history had taken a 
different political path, this might well have produced a different set of boundaries 
between jurisdictions and a different sample of observations for a cross state/province 
regression. Would our estimates of the impact of trade on poverty then be different?
Our measure of poverty is the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon (SST) index of poverty in-
tensity. We use this rather than the poverty rate, since simply counting the number 
of the poor ignores the depth of their poverty. An alternative measure, the average 
poverty gap, considers only the average shortfall of income below the poverty line. 
By contrast, the SST index of poverty index includes the poverty rate, the average 
poverty gap ratio, and inequality among the poor.10
We assume that income is shared among the members of the household, and use 
the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) equivalence scale, which calculates the equiva-
lent income of each family member as total after-tax household income divided by 
the square root of household size. Our measure of the poverty line is set at half the 
median equivalent income. Our data sources are the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
for the United States, which is based on the Current Population Survey; for Canada, 
we use the Survey of Consumer Finance. 
Using weighted least squares analysis to correct for heteroskedasticity results in 
more efﬁ  cient estimators. Since there is not an easily calculated measure of disper-
sion for the SST index, bootstrapping is used to estimate a variance for each state and 
province. By sampling with replacement, and recalculating the SST for each region, 
the variance can be estimated by calculating the standard deviation of 300 repetitions, 
and then used as the weighting factor for the weighted least squares estimation. Those 
states and provinces that have less variation around the point estimate measure of 
poverty receive more weight in the regression. 
To measure the openness of a state or province to trade, we take the product of the 
industrial composition of the labor force (by state/province) and the trade exposure of 
the industries (by country). Export and import data are obtained for two-digit catego-
ries, including agriculture, mining, and manufacturing industries, but not services. 
The industry-level labor force data uses the same industrial classiﬁ  cations. For each 
state or province, the proportion of the labor force in each industry as a percentage 
of all employment is calculated. Finally, the proportions of the labor force in each in-
dustry are multiplied by the share of exports or imports in output, and then summed 
for each province or state. (We use a quadratic form to allow for the possibility that 
trade may have a non-linear impact as the amount of export or import exposure rises.) 
Our sources for trade data are Strategis for Canada and the Statistical Abstract for 
the U.S. Our labor force data are from the Canadian Labor Force Survey and, for the 
U.S., the ICPSR Archive. GDP by industry comes from CANSIM for Canada and the 
Statistical Abstract for the United States. 
Control variables are the unemployment rate, unemployment insurance beneﬁ  ts, 
social assistance payments, and average earnings. In addition, we include dummy 
variables for the years 1991, 1994, and 1997. On the theory that the disadvantaged 
are at the back of the queue for jobs, we use the natural log of the male unemployment 
rate because this speciﬁ  cation gives the greatest anti-poverty weight to changes in 285 THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF TRADE
unemployment occurring at low levels of unemployment. We expect unemployment 
to have a positive coefﬁ  cient. (The data are from CANSIM (Canada) and the Statisti-
cal Abstract (U.S.).) Since unemployment is an important risk factor in poverty, the 
generosity of unemployment insurance beneﬁ  ts is a potentially important variable. 
We summarize the very different systems seen in the various states and provinces as 
the ratio of total unemployment insurance beneﬁ  ts in the province or state to the total 
number of unemployed individuals, and expect a negative coefﬁ  cient. (The Canadian 
data are from CANSIM; the U.S. data are from the Department of Labor Handbook.) 
We also include a measure of the generosity of social assistance in each state and 
province. Although we realize that social assistance systems are even more complex 
than unemployment insurance programs, with widely varying rules and regulations, 
we summarize social assistance generosity by the maximum amount that could be 
received by a single parent with one child. (For the United States, this is the dollar 
amount of maximum Aid to Families with Dependent Children/Temporary Aid to 
Needy Families for a family of two in each state. For Canada, the beneﬁ  ts available in 
each province are reported by the National Council of Welfare.) Since this is a measure 
of the legislated provisions open to an individual with given characteristics, but not 
the value of beneﬁ  ts actually paid, it is not endogenous with respect to the choices of 
individuals to apply for assistance. We expect this variable to have a negative coefﬁ  -
cient. Our ﬁ  nal control variable is average weekly earnings in each state or province. 
(The data sources are CANSIM (Canada) and the Department of Labor Handbook 
(U.S.).) We expect the earnings variable to have a negative coefﬁ  cient.
Regression methods
A popular starting point to analyze the determinants of poverty is ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression. To begin, we model poverty intensity as a function 
of export and import exposure as well as export and import exposure squared. As 
mentioned, controls include the natural log of the male unemployment rate, average 
weekly earnings, monthly unemployment beneﬁ  ts per unemployed person, maximum 
weekly social assistance paid to a single parent with one child, and a set of dummies 
for years 1991, 1994, and 1997.11 OLS allows for straightforward interpretation, with 
the coefﬁ  cients on continuous variables being interpreted as the linear effect on the 
dependent variable of a unit change in the explanatory variable. A logged explanatory 
variable, such as the male unemployment rate, has a coefﬁ  cient that can be interpreted 
as the absolute change in poverty given a relative change in the unemployment rate. 
The standard error of the coefﬁ  cient is the usual standard deviation of the sampling 
distribution of the estimator. 
Since the SST index is calculated for each province and state using survey micro 
data from each country, the sample size within states and provinces is a serious 
concern. Prince Edward Island has the fewest number of observations for a prov-
ince—876—whereas the state with the fewest observations, Wyoming in 1986, has 
only 104. Although the poverty estimates are unbiased, unequal standard errors of 
estimate may lead to the problem of heteroskedasticity.
Our second estimation method is thus to use weighted least squares (WLS) to 
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analytical formula for estimating the standard error that surrounds a point estimate 
of the SST, but Efron and Tibshirani [1986] suggest that 50 to 200 resamples is a 
sufﬁ  cient number to estimate a bootstrap standard error around a point estimate. For 
our model, an estimate of the standard error around each regional SST is obtained by 
bootstrapping using 300 resamples. We then weight the observations in the original 
OLS model by the inverse of the standard error. Regions with smaller SST variability 
and, therefore, more reliability in this measure are weighted more heavily with this 
WLS procedure.
Bootstrapping can also be used in a regression model framework when crucial 
conditions are not met. For example, if the distribution of the residuals in an OLS 
regression is non-normal, hypothesis tests in the model may be unreliable. Our model 
has a sufﬁ  cient number of observations to satisfy the normality assumption.12 The 
estimated bias can be measured as the difference between the actual point estimate 
and the expected value of the bootstrapped estimate. As Mooney and Duval [1993] 
note, Efron [1982] suggests that if the ratio of the estimated bias to the standard error 
is less than 0.25, then the bias of the estimate is not a problem. 
A third estimation technique is to use bootstrapping in our regression model to 
measure the robustness of results, given a different mix of regions. In our sample, we 
have 61 jurisdictions representing states and provinces. Bootstrapping allows us to 
draw a different sample of regions and check the robustness of results, as an answer 
to the question: “Suppose our sample had a different make-up of regions; would this 
matter?” From the current 61 observations, we randomly draw a new sample of 61 that 
could include any individual state or province multiple times or not at all. Estimates 
of the regression coefﬁ  cients are obtained from this new sample. The standard devia-
tions of the coefﬁ  cients are obtained from 1000 replications and used as an estimate 
of the standard error. Signiﬁ  cance of the determinants is analyzed using a standard 
t-test. The double bootstrapping—in estimating poverty intensity as well as in the 
regressions—is a novel addition of this paper.
Simple regression models can sometimes suffer from omitted variable bias. We 
therefore also use panel data techniques to handle unobserved factors, where the 
change in variables is analyzed rather than the levels. By doing so, we exclude un-
observed effects, which are ﬁ  xed over time. One method of handling this problem is 
ﬁ  xed-effects estimation. If we take the mean of all variables over time, take the dif-
ference from each individual value and model this transformed data, the unobserved 
ﬁ  xed effect drops out. Suppose our original model is as follows:
(13)  , 1,2,... it it i it yx a u t T β =+ +=
where ai = constant, unobserved effects.
If we take the mean over time for each cross-sectional unit we have:
 (14)  ii i i yx a u β =+ +
Subtracting equation (14) from equation (13) leaves287 THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF TRADE
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Since the ai term is constant over time, it disappears in the transformation.
For this study, we pool four years of data for each of the 61 states and prov-
inces. There may be factors inherent in particular states or provinces that have an 
inﬂ  uence on poverty, but are not captured in our model. To avoid possible omitted 
variable bias, we analyze the determinants of poverty as differences from the mean. 
Of course, one problem with ﬁ  xed-effects estimation is that only within-region, not 
between-region, variation is considered; that is, only changes over time, not differ-
ences across provinces and states, are used to calculate the regression coefﬁ  cients. If 
there is little variation over time in the variables, then we can expect few coefﬁ  cients 
to be statistically signiﬁ  cant. 
By pooling together Canadian provinces and American states, we are implicitly 
assuming that there is no structural difference in the model between the two coun-
tries—but the effect of one or more of the explanatory variables on poverty intensity 
may be different in the United States than it is in Canada. A Chow statistic tests 
whether the betas are the same in Canada and in the United States.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 presents our results. The ﬁ  rst three columns display the OLS, GLS, and 
bootstrap results, which are remarkably consistent. Import exposure signiﬁ  cantly 
raises poverty, and export exposure signiﬁ  cantly lowers poverty, in each of these 
speciﬁ  cations. The square of export exposure is insigniﬁ  cant, but the square of import 
exposure is signiﬁ  cant and negative. In the bootstrap speciﬁ  cation (3), the import 
exposure and squared import exposure coefﬁ  cients imply a point of inﬂ  ection of 22% 
(0.6165/2×1.4027); below 22%, import exposure raises poverty, but as import exposure 
rises above 22%, it begins to reduce poverty. 
The control variables also have similar results in the ﬁ  rst three columns, and their 
signs match our predictions. Unemployment is signiﬁ  cant in raising poverty, while 
unemployment insurance is signiﬁ  cant in lowering it. More generous social assistance 
beneﬁ  ts lower poverty, but the coefﬁ  cient becomes insigniﬁ  cant once the bootstrap 
method is employed. Higher average earnings are associated with lower poverty, but 
the fact that the coefﬁ  cient is never signiﬁ  cant can be read as an indication of the 
uncoupling of low-wage labor markets from general market trends. 
The dummy variables measure poverty intensity relative to the base year (1986) 
and indicate a secular trend to higher poverty in 1991 and 1997, but insigniﬁ  cantly 
higher in 1994 than in 1986.
These regressions indicate that trade has a signiﬁ  cant effect on poverty, and 
that the import effect raising poverty dominates the export effect lowering poverty; 
the bootstrap regression in column (3) shows a coefﬁ  cient on import exposure of 0.62 
but a coefﬁ  cient on export exposure of -0.49. However, knowing that exports reduce 
poverty and imports raise it presents a policy conundrum, as the two go together. As 
an illustration of the joint impact of trade liberalization, we simulate the net effect of 288 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
  TABLE 1
  Determinants of Poverty
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
 OLS  GLS  Bootstrap  Fixed  Effects  U.S.  Canada
Import exposure  .509047*  .6165*  .6165*  -0.317  1.338***  -0.021
  (.21271)  (.1745) (.23215)  (0.447) (0.785) (0.802)
     [.00353]  [-0.114]  [0.053]  [-0.1909]
Export  exposure  -.45900*  -.4933*  -.4933*  0.117 -1.000 -0.216
  (.22324)  (.1739) (.22823)  (0.209) (1.071) (0.423)
     [.02346]  [0.042]  [-0.011]  [0.1868]
Import exposure  -1.0795  -1.4027*  -1.4027*  0.319  -6.637**  -0.565
squared (.68924)  (.4601)  (.6877)  (1.590)  (2.920)  (-2.382)
     [-.0535]  [0.564]  [-0.219]  [0.4087]
Export exposure  .47066  .5115  .5115  -0.234  -0.808  0.359
squared  (.63608)  (.4469) (.5839)  (0.510) (6.149) (1.231)
     [-.0311]  [-0.152]  [0.062]  [-0.3710]
Male .06569*  .0526*  .0526*  0.027*  0.031*  -0.015
unemployment  (.00677)  (.0066) (.0067)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.037)
rate (ln)      [.0019]  [0.001]  [-0.0004]  [-0.0055]
Monthly  UI  -0.085*  -.067* -.067*  -0.010 0.018 0.010
beneﬁ   ts  per  (0.013)  (.011)  (.012) (0.010) (0.025) (0.029)
unemployed person      [-0.0028]  [-0.0005]  [-0.0002]  [-0.0069]
Social assistance:  -0.091*  -0.038*  -0.038  0.009  -0.027**  -0.007
weekly  maximum  (0.02)  (0.018) (0.038) (0.013) (0.012) (0.220)
beneﬁ  t for 1 parent      [-0.013]  [-0.002]  [0.0011]  [0.0296]
and 1 child
Average weekly  -0.00016  -0.013  -0.013  -0.001  -0.006  0.106
earnings  (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.049) (0.064) (0.365)
     [0.0028]  [-0.002]  [0.0059]  [-0.0560]
1991 dummy  .03982*  .02357*  .02357*  0.003  0.038*  -0.009
  (.00752)  (.00629)  (.00842)  (0.004) (0.011) (0.012)
     [.00276]  [-0.0006]  [0.0001]  [-0.0009]
1994 dummy  .01068***  .00704  .00704  0.003  0.025*  0.007
  (.00629)  (.0057) (.0063)  (0.003) (0.008) (0.015)
     [.00054]  [-0.0003]  [0.0001]  [-0.0041]
1997 dummy  .01973*  .01526*  .01526*  0.008  0.038*  0.010
  (.00718)  (.00665)  (.00697)  (0.005) (0.010) (0.022)
     [.00016]  [0.0007]  [-0.0004]  [-0.0044]
Intercept .01527  .03028    -0.004  -0.025*  -0.002
  (.02085)  (.01932)   (0.003) (0.007) (0.010)
       [0.0026]  [0.00003]  [0.0023]
Number of observations  244  244  244  244  204  40
Adjusted R2  0.4496  0.4540   0.145 0.264 0.480
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index of poverty intensity. Standard errors are in 
parentheses, with the bias (point estimate less bootstrap mean) reported below the standard error in 
columns (3) to (6). 
* indicates signiﬁ  cance at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 90% level.
a simultaneous one-percent rise in both export exposure and import exposure in all 
provinces and states. This calculation is provided in Table 2, which shows, for each 
province and state, the initial (1997) levels of export exposure and import exposure, 
the SST poverty index in 1997, and the percentage change in the poverty index if 
both export exposure and import exposure increased by one percentage point. The 
table shows that the effect of increased trade is negligible in all cases. For all ten 289 THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF TRADE
provinces, an increase in both exports and imports would lower poverty slightly, by 
between 0.15 percent (in Quebec) and 1.31 percent (in Ontario). For U.S. states, a 
one-percentage point rise in both export and import exposure would raise poverty in 
40 of the 51 states; that is, 73% of the U.S. population lives in jurisdictions that can 
expect trade liberalization to produce an increase in poverty. However, what Table 2 
clearly shows is that, even in the states with the largest effects, poverty would change 
by much less than one percent. So while the effect of trade on poverty is statistically 
signiﬁ  cant, it may not be economically signiﬁ  cant.
The fourth column of Table 1 presents the ﬁ  xed-effects results. As discussed in 
section IV, this is our preferred speciﬁ  cation, as the use of ﬁ  xed effects controls for 
each region’s unexplained heterogeneity. The results show that most coefﬁ  cients be-
come insigniﬁ  cant, and many of them change sign. The fact that the trade variables 
become insigniﬁ  cant in column (4) could show that the signiﬁ  cance found in the earlier 
regressions was spurious, due only to the unexplained variability that is now held 
constant. Alternatively, it could be due to the fact that the ﬁ  xed-effects method regresses 
changes in poverty intensity on changes in the independent variables, and many of the 
variables changed little, if at all, over this period. In any event, now the only signiﬁ  cant 
coefﬁ  cient (with the expected positive sign) is on the unemployment rate.
The ﬁ  nal two columns of Table 1 separate the ﬁ  xed-effects regressions for the 
United States and Canada, rather than combining the states and provinces as in col-
umn (4), on the grounds that a Chow test (with an F statistic of 5.46) indicates that the 
coefﬁ  cients estimated over the separate groups are not the same. None of the variables 
is now signiﬁ  cant in the Canadian regression, possibly due to the low sample size of 40, 
representing 10 provinces in four years. However, the U.S. regression indicates that 
unemployment and social assistance are signiﬁ  cant and of the expected sign, and the 
three year dummies are signiﬁ  cant. The export exposure variables are insigniﬁ  cant, 
but the import exposure variables are signiﬁ  cant at the 90% or 95% level. Together, 
the linear and quadratic import exposure variables imply an inﬂ  ection point of 10% 
(1.338/2×6.637)— i.e., that up to a point slightly higher than the average U.S. import 
exposure in 1997 of 9.37%, greater import exposure increases poverty. We conjecture 
that if import exposure raises poverty intensity only at low levels of imports, this may 
explain why the variable is insigniﬁ  cant for Canada—since Canadian provinces have 
higher imports than U.S. states.
Even if trade could be shown to have a much larger adverse impact on poverty, the 
appropriate response would not be to restrict trade. Rather, an awareness that trade, 
while raising average GDP, may harm those at the bottom of the income distribution 
should lead policymakers to re-think the recent retrenchment of social assistance in 
the U.S. and Canada.
This paper uses bootstrapping to construct the standard errors surrounding pov-
erty estimates in order to correct for heteroskedasticity, and to conﬁ  rm the robustness 
of our results to sample selection sensitivity across jurisdictions. Using the Sen-Shor-
rocks-Thon index of poverty intensity and measures of export and import exposure, we 
show that exports lower poverty, and imports raise it, for Canadian provinces and U.S. 
states over the period 1986 to 1997. While these effects are statistically signiﬁ  cant (at 
least in the OLS and GLS speciﬁ  cations), they are never economically signiﬁ  cant.
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 TABLE  2
  Percentage Change in SST Index when Imports and Exports 
  Increased by 1%, 1997
  Import Exposure  Export Exposure  Actual SST  % Change in SST
Newfoundland 0.07086  0.12985 0.10417  -0.15725
PEI 0.08856  0.17913  0.05516  -0.25929
Nova Scotia  0.11491  0.17737  0.09967  -0.22198
New Brunswick  0.09418  0.14163  0.08914  -0.15271
Quebec 0.19055  0.30134  0.08338  -0.45717
Ontario 0.27557  0.30023  0.06778  -1.31281
Manitoba 0.21091  0.3404  0.07359  -0.75435
Saskatchewan 0.18991  0.30698 0.07494  -0.62012
Alberta 0.1539  0.24294  0.05802  -0.45551
British Columbia  0.10805  0.16085  0.07877  -0.17365
Alabama 0.14082  0.08533  0.16364  -0.03027
Alaska  0.05137  0.02359 0.06735 0.10078
Arizona  0.07123  0.05561 0.14219 0.04728
Arkansas 0.14315  0.09371  0.17234  -0.05285
California  0.10402  0.06899 0.13365 0.03495
Colorado  0.06322  0.04813 0.05988 0.07046
Connecticut 0.10052  0.08203  0.06401  -0.00101
Delaware 0.06106  0.0513  0.08447  0.04998
Dist. of Columbia  0.00317  0.00257  0.21681  0.00572
Florida  0.04819  0.03469 0.14669 0.06372
Georgia  0.09939  0.06505 0.09985 0.04908
Hawaii 0.01951  0.01098  0.124  0.04956
Idaho  0.09533  0.06958 0.10606 0.03183
Illinois  0.09136  0.07235 0.10104 0.02432
Indiana 0.14885  0.11107  0.06313  -0.12905
Iowa 0.10409  0.08498  0.08859  -0.01032
Kansas 0.10976  0.0844  0.07998  -0.00652
Kentucky 0.1364  0.0892  0.13969  -0.03526
Louisiana 0.08301  0.0444  0.15556  0.08608
Maine  0.1412  0.07342 0.09473 0.00099
Maryland  0.04673  0.03589 0.05769 0.05552
Massachusetts 0.08574  0.06351 0.11085 0.05776
Michigan 0.13522  0.1022  0.10261  -0.09129
Minnesota  0.08669  0.07158 0.09041 0.0258
Mississippi 0.16433  0.09361  0.14575  -0.09213
Missouri  0.11157  0.07294 0.11172 0.02661
Montana  0.05112  0.02981 0.13583 0.08084
Nebraska  0.07112  0.05949 0.07427 0.04758
Nevada  0.03105  0.02231 0.07857 0.07121
New Hampshire  0.12554  0.09199  0.07358  -0.04077
New Jersey  0.06975  0.04855  0.0822  0.07917
New  Mexico  0.05882  0.03639 0.18489 0.07291
New  York  0.07644  0.04588 0.15859 0.0871
North Carolina  0.13672  0.08915  0.105  -0.04231
North  Dakota  0.05666  0.04349 0.11847 0.09292
Ohio 0.11723  0.09173  0.10351  -0.02917
Oklahoma  0.10322  0.06549 0.12826 0.05018
Oregon  0.0991  0.06986 0.10042 0.03315
Pennsylvania 0.09851 0.06788  0.1041 0.04272
Rhode  Island  0.12284  0.07188 0.12856 0.029105
South Carolina  0.1407  0.09476  0.12898  -0.06311
South  Dakota  0.10247  0.07858 0.14561 0.011891
Tennessee 0.13754  0.08623  0.13757  -0.0258291 THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF TRADE
  TABLE 2 (continued)
  Percentage Change in SST Index when Imports and Exports 
  Increased by 1%, 1997
  Import Exposure  Export Exposure  Actual SST  % Change in SST
Texas 0.0883  0.05668  0.1603  0.061218
Utah 0.08271  0.05933  0.0754  0.065315
Vermont  0.10464  0.07404 0.07785 0.027804
Virginia  0.08077  0.05639 0.12004 0.065236
Washington  0.10446  0.07817 0.09321 0.013897
West  Virginia  0.07714  0.06212 0.17547 0.029668
Wisconsin 0.13258  0.10183  0.06612  -0.08677
Wyoming  0.06203  0.03727 0.12344 0.087958
 
 NOTES
1.  Wyoming has the smallest number of observations—only 104 in 1986.
2.  Even if the poverty line is drawn in a purely relative way, poverty can be eliminated at the same 
time as inequality is rising. For example, a society which started with a distribution of income like 
[4,7,10,15,25] would have a poverty rate of 20% if the poverty line was set at half the median. A series 
of transfers which produced the distribution [6,7,10,11,27] would both eliminate relative poverty and 
increase economic inequality (as measured by the coefﬁ  cient of variation).
3.  However, Feenstra and Hanson [2001] show that trade in intermediate inputs, rather than ﬁ  nal goods, 
could play a strong role in widening the wage gap.
4.  Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book V, Ch. II, Art IV, Cannan Edition, p. 399.
5.  A linear tax/beneﬁ  t schedule would break even (save for administration costs) if shocks were sym-
metric. However, in reality, social insurance and welfare programs are anything but simple.
6.  Canadian UI (now called EI) is a federal program, but its provisions vary with local unemployment, 
which differentiates its impact by province.
7.  These are the only recent years for which household-level data are available for both Canada and the 
United States.
8.  For example, British victory in the crucial Battle of Queenston Heights in the War of 1812-14 depended 
heavily on the element of surprise and advance intelligence of the battle plans of the invading U.S. 
forces.
9.  The Quebec sovereignty referendum of 1995 was defeated by less than 0.2% of votes cast.
10.  The Sen-Shorrocks-Thon (SST) index of poverty intensity is calculated as I = (rate) × (gap) × (1 + G(x)), 
where rate is the percentage of the population with incomes below the poverty line, gap is the average 
percentage gap between the incomes of the poor and the poverty line, and G(x) is the Gini index of 
inequality of the poverty gap among all people.
11.  Ideally, a dummy variable indicating the observation is a province would be included to control for 
the “Canada effect,” but a ﬁ  xed-effects model does not allow for non-varying indicators over time. For 
comparability across speciﬁ  cations, we exclude it for all runs.
12.  A plot of the residuals conﬁ  rms this.
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